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With the passage by Congress of the Indian Financing Act,' the op-
portunity for the Five Civilized Tribes to enter the business world
is greatly enhanced. The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act2 gave the
Five Civilized Tribes the right to organize and acquire land for
their use.' The Indian Financing Act provides them with the
capital to purchase land and finance their businesses. Once the
Five Civilized Tribes start availing themselves of these loans and
organizing businesses, problems will arise as to whether these
businesses may be taxed.
This note will limit its scope to businesses organized by the Five
Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma. Because of their similar legislative
histories, an analysis of all five together is appropriate. In addi-
tion, the scope will be limited to an exemption from Oklahoma's
sales taxs on sales by the businesses to non-Indians.
History
Upon the arrival of the first Europeans to America, the Five
Civilized Tribes lived in what are now the southeastern states of
the United States.6 Later, due to pressure from the white popula-
tion wishing to settle on the land occupied by the tribes, the tribes
moved westward.7 To induce the tribes to move, the federal
government entered into treaties with the tribes promising them
certain rights upon the surrender of their land. One of the most
important provisions of the treaties was that the tribes were to
have the right of self-government This right was guaranteed by
1. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. 1976).
2. 49 Stat. 1967 (1936).
3. Id. at § 1.
4. G. FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES preface (1934): "These tribes, the Cherokee,
Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw and Seminole, were distinguished by character and in-
telligence far above the average aboriginal .... Because of their progress and achievements
they came to be known as The Five Civilized Tribes."
S. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1310 (1971).
6. G. FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 17 n.4 (1934).
7. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (D.D.C. 1976).
8. See Treaty with the Cherokee, Aug. 6, 1846, 9 Stat. 871; Treaty with the Choctaws
and Chickasaws, June 22, 1855, 11 Stat. 611; Treaty with Creeks and Seminoles, Aug. 7,
1856, 11 Stat. 699.
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later treaties.' This guarantee prevailed until the federal govern-
ment passed acts providing for the allotment of tribal lands."
The allotment acts" provided for the compulsory allotment of
the tribal lands in severalty. Each act provided that the allotted
land would be tax exempt." At the same time, Congress adopted
the policy of terminating tribal governments.'"That policy was im-
plemented by the Five Tribes Act of 1906.'"
The Curtis Act,'5 enacted before the Five Tribes Act, also ap-
plied to the Five Civilized Tribes. Several provisions of the Curtis
Act affected the sovereign power of the tribes' governments. Sec-
tion 14 of the Act provided for establishing territorial municipal
governments within the tribes' reservations.'6 Section 26 of the Act
made the civil law of the tribes unenforceable in federal courts'7
and Section 28 abolished the tribal courts.'8 However, the Act did
not totally eliminate the sovereignty of the tribes.'"
Congress, by passing the Five Tribes Act, contemplated the
complete abolition of the tribes' governments." One of the more
damaging provisions of the Act was contained in Section
11:"[P]rovided, that all taxes accruing under tribal laws or regula-
tions of the Secretary of the Interior shall be abolished from and
after [December 31, 1905.'"I Although the original purpose of the
Act was to provide for the final disposition of the affairs of the
tribes, it never accomplished that purpose. Instead, Section 28
provided: "[Tihe tribal existence and present tribal governments
of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole
tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect for
all purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided by
law. ... "22 However, "The legal effect of this provision was un-
9. See Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty with the Choctaw
and Chickasaw, April 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 769; Treaty with the Creek, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat.
785: Treaty with the Seminole, March 21, 1866, 14 Stat. 755.
10. See 32 Stat. 716 (1902); 30 Stat. 495 (1898); 31 Stat. 861 (1901); 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
Following the passage of these Acts, Congress began to address the tribes as a group rather
than individually.
11. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 434-35 (1971 ed.).
12. Id. at 435-38.
13. Id. at 429-30.
14. 34 Stat. 137 (1906). The intent of the Act was "To provide for the final disposition of
affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes."
15. 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
16. Id. at 499.
17. id. at 504.
1. Id. at 504-505.
19. SeeHarjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1124 (D.D.C. 1976).
20. Id. at 1126.
21. 34 Stat. 137, § 11 (1906).
22. Id. at § 28.
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mistakable: Congress had declined to terminate the tribal ex-
istence or dissolve tribal governments, despite all of its earlier in-
dications to do so .... "' Thus, after passage of the Five Tribes
Act, the validity of the tribes' governments remained intact,
although now limited by both the Five Tribes Act and the Curtis
Act.
In 1936, Congress passed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. 4
This Act incorporated all rights and privileges given to tribes
under the Indian Reorganization Act,2 which had specifically ex-
empted the Five Civilized Tribes.26 The Indian Reorganization Act
and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act evidenced a new policy of
the federal government: "[Indians can better meet the problems of
modern life through corporate, group, or tribal action rather than
as assimilated individuals"; 7 and "The central provisions of the
Act ended allotments in severalty, allowed the re-establishment of
communal lands, and permitted the organization of tribal govern-
ments with control over tribal funds."' Thus, the federal govern-
ment had come full circle in its policy toward the Indians, from
enacting treaties and statutes allowing the continued existence of
tribal governments, to termination, and back to continued ex-
istence. After over a hundred years of control by Congress, the
Five Civilized Tribes had survived with many of their sovereign
powers intact.
Case Law
An analysis of the Five Civilized Tribes' right to an exemption
from Oklahoma's sales tax requires consideration of a series of
cases involving Indian tax questions. In McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Commission,." Rosalind McClanahan, a Navajo Indian,
brought an action to recover $16.20 withheld from her income as
Arizona state income tax. McClanahan claimed that because all
the income was earned on the Navajo Reservation, the state tax
was unlawful as applied to Navajo Indians."°
The Supreme Court reviewed the various doctrines used by the
courts in previous cases dealing with Indian issues. The Court
23. See Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110,1129 (D.D.C. 1976).
24. 49 Stat. 1967 (1936).
25. Id. at 1967 § 3.
26. 48 Stat. 984, § 13 (1934).
27. Board of County Commn'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 n.20 (1943).
28. See Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1136 (D.D.C. 1976).
29. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
30. Id. at 166.
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observed that in the past the Indian sovereignty doctrine' and
federal instrumentality doctrine " had been in vogue, but the recent
trend was toward using federal preemption as the test for deter-
mining state tax validity." The federal preemption test doctrine re-
quires the Court to consider relevant treaties and statutes to deter-
mine whether the area in which the state wishes to apply its tax is
regulated by the federal government. If it is, the state cannot apply
its tax, as the federal government is considered to have preempted
the area."
Using this doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the state had
exceeded its authority in taxing the income of the appellant." In
reaching its decision, the Court also considered the Navajo Treaty
of 1868,36 the Arizona Enabling Act,3' the Buck Act, 8 and the In-
dian Civil Rights Act.3" Based on these considerations, the Court
concluded that the appellant's "activity is totally within the sphere
which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal
Government and for the Indians themselves.""
In the same year as McClanahan the Supreme Court decided
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones." Mescalero involved a snow ski
enterprise owned by the tribe in New Mexico." The enterprise was
established on land acquired under the authority of the Indian
Reorganization Act. 3 The state of New Mexico claimed the right
to impose a tax on the gross receipts of the ski resort." The tribe
contended the enterprise was a federal instrumentality and
31. Id. at 168. This doctrine recognized that Indian tribes have retained over the years
some inherent powers attributable to any sovereign. Thus, unless those powers have been
abrogated by the federal government, the tribe may still exercise them. See The Kansas In-
dians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
32. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 169 (1973). The federal in-
strumentality doctrine holds that the states may not tax any part of the federal government.
The reasoning as applied to Indian tribes is that since they are under the control of the
federal government, they are a federal instrumentality and, thus, cannot be taxed by the
states. SeeThe New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
33. Id. at 170.
34. See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
35. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,177 (1973).
36. 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
37. 36 Stat. 568 (1910).
38. 4 U.S.C. § 105 (1964).
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1964).
40. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973).
41. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
42. Id.
43. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
44. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). In addition to the gross
receipts tax, the state attempted to impose a use tax on personalty used in connection with
the business.
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therefore immune from state taxes because it was acquired in ac-
cordance with provisions in the Indian Reorganization Act. 5 In
addition, the tribe contended that Section 5 of the Indian Re-
organization Act specifically exempted the business from
taxation. 6 The Court rejected both contentions.
In regard to the instrumentality theory, the Court noted that the
federal instrumentality doctrine had been rejected in numerous
cases." Furthermore, the Court determined that none of the provi-
sions of the Indian Reorganization Act could be construed as
establishing federal instrumentality status for projects initiated
under the Act.48 Concerning Section 5 of the Act, the Court stated
that the language which exempted from taxation "any lands or
rights acquired" under the Act, should be interpreted to exempt
"land and rights in land."4 The Court held that the language of the
Act was not specific enough to give an exemption to the tribe from
the gross receipts tax and that it would not imply an exemption
from this language.-
Three years after Mescalero, the Supreme Court considered
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes.5' In this case the
tribes questioned the validity of the application of Montana's
cigarette tax to sales made on tribal reservation land by businesses
owned by tribal members.2 The tax as it applied to sales to both
Indians and non-Indians was considered.53
The Court held that the cigarette sales tax as applied to Indian
consumers was invalid." In support, the Court quoted from
Mescalero: "[Tihere has been no satisfactory authority for taxing
Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried
on within the boundaries of the reservations.""' However, the
Court found the tax as it applied to sales to non-Indians was
within the proper exercise of state power. The Court reasoned that
"it is the non-Indian consumer or user who saves the tax and reaps
the benefit of the tax exemption.""6 Since the burden of the tax fell
45. Id. at 150.
46. Id. at 155.
47. Id. at 150.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 155. The Court said that "rights in land" did not include income derived from
land under the Act, thus, no exemption.
50. Id. at 156.
51. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 476.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 481.
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on the non-Indian, the Court felt there was no reason to allow an
exemption.
The case of Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion v. Washington, 7 a federal district court case from the Eastern
District of Washington, provides some direction on the problem
of an exemption for the Five Civilized Tribes. In Colville, the Col-
ville, Makah, and Lummi tribes within the state of Washington
joined in a suit against the state seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief from Washington's statutes and regulations which imposed a
sales tax on cigarette and tobacco products sold to non-Indians by
tribally licensed retailers at shops owned by the tribes." The state
did not assert that it had any right to impose the tax on sales to In-
dians."9
Each of the tribes had enacted their own ordinances regulating
the sale, distribution, and taxation of cigarettes and other tobacco
products on their reservation. The Makah Tribe organized and
passed its cigarette ordinance under authority of the Indian
Reorganization Act.' The ordinance had been approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required in the Indian Reorganization
Act." The Colville and Lummi tribes, however, did not organize
under the Indian Reorganization Act. Rather, they organized and
passed their cigarette ordinances according to Section 53.1 of Title
25 of the Code of Federal Regulation, which contains the same
conditions imposed on tribes organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act.62 The ordinances of the Colville and Lummi
tribes were also approved by the Secretary of the Interior."
In discussing the merits, the district court first considered the
tribes' contention that this case could be distinguished from Moe
because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the tribe, while in
Moe, it fell on the consumer." The Court rejected this argument:
"Where on-reservation tribal sales to non-Indians are involved,
the first taxable event is, therefore, the use or consumption by the
non-Indian purchaser. In such situations, the legal incidence falls
57. 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978), pet. for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W, 3278 (U.S.
Oct. 24, 1978) (No. 78 -630).
58. Id. at 1345.
59. Id. at 1346 n.4
60. Id. at 1361.
61. See 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
62. Id.
63. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp.
1339, 1361 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
64. Id. at 1352, 1353.
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upon the non-Indian purchaser rather than the tribal- seller.""°
The Court also briefly discussed the tribes' contention that the
Indian Reorganization Act, Indian Financing Act, and Indian Self-
Determination Act established a well-defined federal policy of
promoting Indian self-government and economic growth and that
this policy preempted state taxation.' The Court found no
authority for holding that such policy implied a tax immunity. °'
Mescalero was cited as the authority for holding that federal
policy does not necessarily create a tax immunity.'
The tribes also argued that the tax imposed by the state had
been preempted by the tribal cigarette ordinances. °° The Court
acknowledged clear authority that the exercise of federally
delegated authority by an Indian tribe is sufficient to preempt a
state statute which conflicts with the delegated authority." Con-
sideration was then given to whether the tribes actually possessed
federally delegated authority.
Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act had authorized the
reestablishment of tribal governments and adoption of tribal con-
stitutions. Citing Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,2 which held
that power to tax both Indians and non-Indians is a recognized
tribal power, the Court concluded that the Makah Tribe exercised
federally delegated authority under the Indian Reorganization
Act.7" The Court also said that it was insignificant that the Colville
and Lummi tribes were not organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act. Since the tribes' actions were approved by the
Secretary of the Interior and subject to the same regulations as the
Indian Reorganization Act, the Court felt the tribes came under
the federal program and thus were exercising federally delegated
65. Id. at 1355.
66. Id. at 1359, 1360.
67. Id. at 1360.
68. Id. at 1359.
69. Id. at 1360.
70. Id. The Court cited Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976), to support its state-
ment, although it admitted that the state statute preenpted in the case did not affect non-
Indians. To support its statement that state statfte" which affect non-Indians may be
preempted, the Court referred to Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v.
Washington, 412 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Wash. 1976) and Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v.
North Carolina, No. BC-C-76-65 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 27,1976).
71. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
72. 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). This was an action by several members of the tribe to en-
join it from assessment and collection of taxes for the privilege of grazing stock on reserva-
tion land. The Court said, "the defendant Oglala Sioux Tribe possesses the power of taxa-
tion which is an inherent incident of its sovereignty."
73. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp.
1339, 1361 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
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authority." Consequently, the Court found that since the state
statute was regulating the same matter as the tribal ordinances, the
state statute had been preempted."
Analysis
To determine if the Five Civilized Tribes are exempt from
Oklahoma's gross sales tax, it is necessary to decide how the fac-
tors used in the preceding cases will apply to the tribes. First, in
Moe' and Colville'7 both Courts felt that it was important to
determine whether the legal incidence of the tax fell on the con-
sumer or the business. Oklahoma has a two per cent gross sales
tax upon a variety of items ranging from food to hardware." The
statute states, "[the] tax levied is... paid by the consumer or user
to the vendor."7 Thus, the literal meaning of the statute clearly
specifies that the legal incidence of the tax falls on the consumer
and not the business.
Another factor to determine is to whom the sales are to be
made. In Moe, the Court found an exemption from the state sales
tax on sales to Indians, but not on sales to non-Indians." It is clear-
ly within the power of a tribe to limit its sales to members of the
tribe, eliminating the problem found in Moe; however, the ma-
jority of cases indicate that most tribes set up their businesses to
sell to both Indians and non-Indians.8 Additionally, since the
areas in eastern Oklahoma occupied by the Five Civilized Tribes
are densely populated by non-Indians, providing a larger sales
market, it is likely that most businesses will allow sales to non-
Indians.
The authority under which the tribes organize and adopt laws
and ordinances is another factor which may determine the
likelihood of an exemption for the tribes. The Five Tribes Act of
190682 attempted to abolish the tribal governments of the Five
Civilized Tribes.' However, as previously discussed, this Act did
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
77. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp.
1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
78. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1310 (1971).
79. Id.
80. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
81. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Tonasket v. State, 448 P.2d 281 (Wash. 1971).
82. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
83. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1126 (D.D.C. 1976).
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not totally eliminate the sovereign powers of the tribes.84 The In-
dian Reorganization Act provided for the reorganization of tribal
governments.' Under provisions of this Act, those powers which
had remained intact after the attempted termination of the tribal
governments and which had been held continually from the date
of such attempted termination by the tribe as a whole, were
returned to the reorganized tribal governments. Although the Five
Civilized Tribes were excluded from the Indian Reorganization
Act,' they were included in the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. "7
This latter Act provided that the Five Civilized Tribes should have
all rights and privileges which had previously been given to other
tribes by the authority of the Indian Reorganization Act." Thus, if
the Five Civilized Tribes were to organize and adopt laws and or-
dinances pursuant to the provisions in the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act, those laws and ordinances would be federally
delegated authority under the rationale of Colville."' If the state
statutes covered the same subject matter as the tribal ordinances,
the statutes would be preempted.
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the power
to tax was one of the existing powers of the Five Civilized Tribes at
the time of the enactment of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.
"Tribal governments are subject to the plenary power of Congress
and so retain only those powers which Congress allows them to
retain."" The Court in Iron Crow1 held that the power to tax is a
power vested in Indian tribes; therefore, the Five Civilized Tribes
have the power absent abrogation of that power by Congress. A
review of the Five Tribes Act of 190692 leaves unclear whether the
tribes possess the power to tax.
The pertinent language used by Congress in the Act is "all taxes
accruing under tribal laws or regulations of the Secretary of the In-
terior shall be abolished from and after [December 31,
19051.... ."' The language could be interpreted as abolishing the
existing laws and the power to enact any future tax laws. Since the
language does not specifically refer to abolishing the tribes' power
84. Id. at 1129.
85. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
86. Id. at § 13.
87. 49 Stat. 1967 (1936).
88. Id.
89. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp.
1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
90. Id. at 1361.
91. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
92. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
93. Id.
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to enact future taxes, the best interpretation would be that the Act
only abolished the existing tax laws of the tribes of 1906."'
An alternative basis for the tribes' power to tax is found in the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. Section 3 of the Act states: "The
Secretary of the Interior may issue to any such organized group a
charter .... Such charter may convey to the incorporated
group ... the right to participate in the revolving credit fund and
to enjoy any other rights or privileges secured to an organized In-
dian tribe under the [Indian Reorganization Act]"' Again, the
language of the Act is not clear. It could be interpreted to say that
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act tribes received all rights and
privileges given to other Indian tribes by the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act, or in the alternative, that the Oklahoma Indian Welfare
Act tribes received all rights and privileges that were already
possessed by the Indian Reorganization Act tribes. The latter in-
terpretation would confer on the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act
tribes the right to tax, because the Indian Reorganization Act
tribes possessed taxation rights." The intent of the Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act was to "promote the general welfare of the
Indians of the State of Oklahoma"; therefore, the better inter-
pretation would appear to be that the Act did give the Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act tribes all the rights and privileges of the Indian
Reorganization Act tribes, including the right to tax.
Conclusion
There is a good possibility that in the future a court will have to
determine if businesses operated by the Five Civilized Tribes are
exempt from Oklahoma's two per cent sales tax on sales to non-
Indians. If the court rules the tribes are exempt, it will have to
make certain findings of fact and conclusions of law to support
that holding. First, the court will have to find that the tribes have
organized pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act. Alternatively, if the tribes have not organized pur-
suant to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act,' the court will have to
find, as in Colville," that the tribes have organized pursuant to the
94. For a discussion of powers left in the Seminole Tribe, see Work, The "Terminated"
Five Tribes of Oklahoma: The Effect of Federal Legislation and Administration Treatment
on the Government of the Seminole Nation, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 81 (1978).
95. .9 Stat. 1967 (1936).
96. See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
97. 49 Stat. 1967 (1936).
98. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp.
1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
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provisions of Section 53.1 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. Second, the court will have to find that the tribes
have enacted tribal ordinances that regulate and tax the same
items that are taxed under Oklahoma's sales tax. Third, the court
will have to decide, according to Colville, that Section 16 of the
Indian Reorganization Act' confers on Indian Reorganization Act
tribes, therefore on the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act tribes,
federally delegated authority. Fourth, the Court will have to
decide either that Section 11 of the Five Tribes Act of 1906 did not
abolish the power of the Five Civilized Tribes to tax, or that Sec-
tion 3 of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act reconferred that
power on the tribes.
99. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
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